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I. JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2d-3 (2)(e) (1987) granting appeals from district
court in criminal cases involving a third degree felony.

n. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction entered in
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Criminal Case No.

88932.

Defendants were each convicted of one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8
(1) (a) (iv) (1986) and one count of possession of a controlled substance
without tax stamps affixed, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-19-106
(1988), both third degree felonies.
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the investigative stop, detention and subsequent search
of the defendants vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
a. whether the traffic stop of the vehicle was a pretext.
b. whether the investigative detention of defendants was illegal
because it was not based on reasonable suspicion and lasted longer
than necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop.
c. whether the consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary
because it was obtained pursuant to an illegal detention.
2. Whether

the UTAH

ILLEGAL

DRUG

STAMP

TAX

ACT

is

unconstitutional in that it violates Article I, § 8 cl. 3 of the United States
Constitution.
3. Whether the UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT violates
defendants

privilege

against

self-incrimination

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

as guarranteed

by

the

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMhNA i i V E

United States Constitution AnuMidmeni V.
United States Constitution Article I, § 8, cl. 3.
United States Constitution Amendment IV.
Utah Constitution Article I, § 14.

.

Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (1986).
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-101 through!07 (1«»KK v I Ad.tni.li.i.. " \"\
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April
charged

14, 1988, Defendants, Robinson and Towers were each

by information

with

one count

of possession

of a controlled

substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third degree felong, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (1986) (R.43-44).

The

State filed an Amended Information on May 9, 1988, which, in addition to
the possession with intent to distribute charge, charged both

defendants

with one count of possession of marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §59-19-106
(R.45-46).

(1988)

The charges were the result of a traffic stop, detention and

subsequent search of the defendants vehicle.
Prior to trial, defendants filed a Motion to Suppress and a Motion to
Dismiss Count II of the Amended Information
(R.50-52).

involving the tax stamps.

Based upon testimony heard and received at a hearing on the

motion to suppress and memoranda submitted by counsel, the trial court
denied the motion and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order. (R.117-123).

The court found

that Trooper Garcia stopped

vehicle driven by Towers for the traffic violation of swerving
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contrary to public policy. (R-128).

The court found further that marijuana

is not a legitimate article of commerce since it is unlawful to possess,
transport or sell.
In applying the United States Supreme Court test for determining
whether

the

tax

violates

defendant's

fifth

amendment

right

against

self-incrimination, the court found that the tax payer is not compelled to
give any information whatsoever, other than the quanity of stamps desired
to be purchased nor is there a registration form or tax return; the only
requirements are that the tax amount be paid and the stamps affixed
the controlled

substance. (R-130).

to

In addition, there is no compelled

information which would prove a "significant link" in the chain of evidence
tending

to

purchasers.

establish

guilt

because

the

stamp

does

not

identify

the

(131).

Finally, the court found further that the statute is not vague as its
terms are specifically defined and it is otherwise clear as to where to affix
the stamps. (R-132).
Following the denial of both motions, defense counsel submitted the
case to the court based on the stipulation of counsel.
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The court found both

defendants

guilty of Count I and Count II and sentenced

them to

concurrent terms of 0 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison on both counts
notwithstanding the States1 recommendation of probation.

The trial court

granted

II

certification

for

probable

case

certification as to Count I. (R-156).

as to Count

but

denied

The Court of Appeals denied a

Certificate of Probable Cause as to both counts and this appeal followed.

VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 12, 1988, at 10:35 a.m. defendants Kim Alexander P.
Robinson and Francis Xavier Towers were travelling in a gray van with
California license plates, east on 1-80 up Parleys Canyon. (R-5).

At the

same time, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Anthony Garcia, was travelling in
the left lane and was attempting to pass the van when it swerved into the
passing lane about a foot and 1/2 and quickly returned to the right lane.
(R-6).

The toooper proceeded to stop the van and was joined by Utah

Highway Patrol Trooper, Lane Ogden, who had been following in close
proximity. (R-6).
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Trooper Garcia approached the van and asked the driver, Towers, for
his license and registration to the vehicle, while Trooper Ogden approached
the passenger side of the van.

Towers gave Trooper Garcia his license but

did not produce a registration. (R-8).

Robinson explained that the van was

owned by his boss who had given them permission to drive the van from
California

to Wyoming. (R-9).

Robinson

then gave Trooper Garcia a

telephone number where he could reach his boss and pulled out a sign
from behind the seat which said, "Shamrock Floor Covering" indicating
where he worked and the business telephone number. (R-10).

The trooper

observed that the telephone number Robinson had given him was not the
same as the number on the sign. (R-10).
Trooper Garcia then asked Robinson and Towers where they were
going

and

they responded

Wyoming, fishing.

that they were going

to the Wind

Rivers,

The trooper looked into the van and noticed that the

two did not have, what he considered, suitable gear for such a trip. (R-10).
While talking to Towers, Trooper Garcia also noticed there was a built-up
homemade

bed

inside

the

van

that

extended

from

the

driver

and

passengers seat all the way to the rear doors. (R-14). While Trooper Ogden

-8-

remained

at the van talking to Robinson

and Towers, Trooper

Garcia

returned to his patrol car and tried unsuccessfully to verify ownership of
the van and then issued a warning citation to Towers for the lane violation.
(R-12).
Based on Trooper Ogden's conversation with Robinson and Towers,
the troopers decided that they would ask Towers and Robinson for consent
to search their vehicle. (R-13).

Trooper Garcia first asked the defendants if

they were carrying any weapons, large sums of money, or narcotics in the
vehicle. (R-14).

Both Robinson and Towers said no.

Then Trooper Garcia

asked them if they could make a search of their vehicle and Robinson
responded, "Sure go ahead". (R-14).

At that time, Trooper Garcia told

Robinson to get the keys to the van and to open the back doors.

The

trooper then saw that the opening of the homemade bed was covered with
a piece of plywood. (R-16).

Trooper Garcia also observed what he believed

to be marijuana seeds on the floor of the van. (R-16).
Unable to see inside of the homemade bed as he had hoped, Trooper
Garcia asked Robinson what was under the bed and Robinson replied that it
contained the "personal belongings" of his boss.

-9-

The trooper then asked

Robinson how they could get access to the underneath of of the bed and
Robinson replied that access could be gained through the side door of the
van which was broken. (R-17).

Trooper Garcia asked Robinson if he could

try and open the door and, after Robinson unlocked it, opened the door.
(R-17).
Still unable to see into the built-up bed, Trooper

Garcia

asked

Robinson if he could remove some screws from the plywood board so he
could see underneath the bed.

Robinson again said no because his boss

kept his personal belongings under there. (R-19).

Trooper Garcia then told

Robinson and Towers that he was going to impound the vehicle and get a
search warrant, however, if Robinson would let them look under the bed
then they could be on their way. (R-48-57).

Robinson again said no to the

search.
Trooper Ogden then asked Robinson and Towers if they could bring a
narcotics canine from the airport to go through the van, to which Robinson
replied "Yes" but asked, "Does this mean I am giving consent to the
search?" to which the trooper replied, "yes".

Both Robinson and Towers

testified that they flatly denied consent to have the dog sniff the van.

-10-

Consequently, Trooper Garcia contacted narcotics agents and requested a
canine to respond to the scene.
arrived

and, in

the course

After another twenty minutes, the dog

of the

search,

the dog

alerted

positively

indicating the presence of controlled substances and Robinson and Towers
were arrested.

Following

the arrest, the troopers obtained

a search

warrant for the van and located approximately 243 pounds of marijuana
located in the built-up compartment within the van.

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

The investigative stop, detention and subsequent search of the

van violated the defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures as guarranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

A brief

investigatory stop of a vehicle is justified if an officer has a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity or if a traffic violation is committed in the
officer's presence.

In this case, Trooper Garcia testified that he stopped the

defendant's van to issue a warning for a lane violation.

A traffic stop is

considered a pretext to search for evidence of criminal activity if a

-11-

reasonable hypothetical police officer would not have made the stop absent
an

articulated

suspicion

of

hypothetical police officer

criminal

activity.

Since,

a reasonable

would not have stopped the vehicle for a

common place lane violation, the traffic stop was a pretext to search the
van for evidence of drug trafficking.

Accordingly, the evidence seized as a

result of the primary illegality, the pretext stop, should be suppressed.
In addition, the further detention of Robinsion and Towers following
the traffic stop was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
since neither defendant was free to leave.
detention is justified

only if the officer

A seizure or investigative
has a reasonable, articuable

suspicion that a defendant has committed a crime.

This suspicion cannot

be unparticularized or based upon a "hunch".
In this case, Trooper Garcia relied primarily upon the "nervousness"
of the defendants coupled with the lack of suitable outdoor-gear and the
presence of only one fishing pole as the sole basis for believing Robinson
and Towers were engaged

in criminal

activity,

"Nervousness"

alone,

however, is not a legitimate factor giving rise to a reasonable suspicion and
has been flatly rejected as such by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
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Court of Appeals.

Therefore, Trooper Garcia did not have a reasonable

articuable suspicion necessary to justify the further detention of Robinson
and Towers following the intitial traffic stop.
Moreover,

an investigative

detention

necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop.

may

last

only

as long

as

The purpose of the stop in

this case was to issue a warning citation for a lane violation.

Though that

purpose was accomplished in a matter of minutes, the troopers detained
Robinson

and

Towers

approximately

forty

minutes

while

consistently

trying to obtain consent to search a compartment located within the van.
Consequently, the seizure of the defendants was unreasonable and violated
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.

Accordingly,

the evidence seized as a result of the illegal

detention should be suppressed.
Finally, Robinson's consent to the canine search of the built-up bed
was obtained as a result of the illegal detention and therefore is invalid.
The troopers repeatedly asked Robinson for consent to search the built-up
bed located within

the van and Robinson continously refused

consent.

Nonetheless, over a period of forty minutes, the troopers were finally

-13-

successful in getting Robinson's consent to a canine search of the van.

At

no time did the troopers advise either defendant of the right to refuse
consent but rather repeatedly told them that they would not be released
unless they would let the troopers see what was in the compartment.

In

addition, the troopers told Robinson and Towers that the van would be
impounded and a search warrant obtained unless they consented to the
search

which

led the defendants

to believe

that they

had no choice.

Therefore, the consent was not voluntary and the evidence obtained as a
result of the search pursuant to such consent should be suppressed.
II.

The Utah Illegal Drug Tax is unconstitutional in that it violates

the interstate commerce clause, by taxing an individual participating in
interstate commerce who was merely travelling through the state.

The

defendants did not have a sufficient nexus to the state to be required to
pay a tax in the state.

The tax is not fairly apportioned and it discriminates

against interstate commerce.

Furthermore it is not related

to services

provided by the state.
The statute is also unconstitutional

in that it violates

the

Amendment's prohibition against forced incrimination by requiring

-14-

Fifth

stickers to be placed on the marijuana.

As such it is a forced admission of

the knowledge element of the offense.
Furthermore the statute violates the due process clause by not fully
informing an individual of one's duties under the law.

VIII. ARGUMENT

I. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE
INVESTIGATIVE STOP OF THE VEHICLE VIOLATED THE
DEFENDANTS RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES GUARRANTEED BY THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTILCE I SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated . . . United States Constitution
Amendment IV.

The United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court

and the Utah Court of Appeals have found

the Fourth

Amendment

applicable to "brief investigatory stops that fall short of official traditional
arrests".

State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing

Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S. 1, 16-17, 88S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L. Ed 889 (1968);
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See also. State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987).

Accordingly,

the stop of the vehicle in this case must comply with the constitutional
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
A brief

investigatory

stop of a vehicle

justified on one of two alternative grounds:
reasonable

suspicion,

based

on

objectve

reasonable person would draw from

may be

constitutionally

(1) it can be based on a
facts

and

the

inferences

a

those facts, that the individual

or

vehicle is involved in criminal activity; or (2) it can be incident to a lawful
stop for a traffic violation.

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975; See also. Utah Code

Ann. §77-7-15 (1982).

A. The traffic stop of the vehicle was pretexual

A law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle for a traffic violation
committed

in the officer's

presence, but may not "use a misdemeanor

arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime."

State v.

Arroyo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Sierra, at 977). In
determining

whether a traffic

stop and subsequent

courts look to the totality of circumstances.
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IdL

arrest is a pretext,

Whether the Fourth

Amendment has been violated depends on an objective assessment of the
officers actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at
the time rather than the subjective intent of the officer.

icL

(citing

Maryland v. Macon. 472 U. S. 463, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L. Ed
(1985); Sierra, at 977).

370

The fact that police officers have a great deal of

discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation or effect a full arrest
coupled with the fact that "very few drivers can traverse any appreciable
distance without violating some traffic regulations, [makes] this

[pretextual

traffic stop] . . . indeed a frightening possibility". Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979
(quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure, §5.2 (e) (2d. Ed. 1987).

Therefore, in

determining whether Trooper Garcia's stop of the van for a lane violation
was

an

unconstitutional

pretext

the

test

is

"whether

a

hypothetical

reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting
him or her", would have stopped Robinson and Towers to issue a warning
for crossing into the left lane, not whether the trooper
made the stop.

could validly have

Sierra. 754 P.2d at 978.

Trooper Garcia testified that he was travelling east in the left lane
attempting to pass the defendant's van when the van swerved into the

-17-

passing lane about a foot and half.

Towers, the driver of the van, testified

that he did not see the trooper approaching when he was about to pass the
slow moving tractor-trailers on the hill.

The trial court found the fact that

the van swerved into the left land causing the trooper to slam on his
brakes was a legitimate reason for stopping the vehicle.
trial court relied entirely
whether

he

could

on the subjective

validly

have made the

In this regard, the

intent of the trooper
stop.

However,

and

it is a

well-established rule that "the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant"
in determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, at
least in the ocntext of pretext traffic stops. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977.
sense did the trial court consider or make a determination

In no

whether a

"reasonable hypothetical officer" would have made the stop.
In

fact,

abruptly

swerving

into

the

passing

lane

and

quickly

returning to the right lane is entirely consistent with Tower's testimony
that he was about to enter the passing lane and didn't see the on coming
car.

It is often the case that a driver will attempt to enter the left lane and,

because of the blind spot in the side mirror, not realize there is a vehicle
approaching in that lane.

The reflex response in that situation is to swerve
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abruptly

and return

to the free

lane.

In this regard,

it is

entirely

inconceiveable that a driver transporting 243 pounds of illegal marijuana
for distribution would see an approaching highway patrolman in his side
mirror

and deliberately

arouse suspicion.

swerve into that lane to attract attention

and

It is also unlikely that a reasonable police officer would

stop such a vehicle and issue a warning citation for the rather common
mistake of attempting to enter the already occupied passing lane.
It is much more plausible that Trooper Garcia noticed the van with
California license plates and the two defendants, Robinson and Towers, and
decided to stop them for the suspected transportation of narcotics.

This

conclusion is buttressed by the trooper's request to search the van based
on his observation through the driver's window of the homemade bed, lack
of suitable out-door gear and one fishing rod, coupled with the apparent
"nervousness" of the defendants.

Therefore, a reasonable officer would not

have stopped the van and cited Towers for a lane violation absent some
"unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity".
P.2d at 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

A r r o y o . 770

Accordingly, since the stop itself was

unconsitutional, all evidence subsequently seized is inadmissible and
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should be suppressed.
United

See e.g.. Sierra. 748 P.2d at 184; citing Wong Sun v.

States, 371 U. S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); 4W.

LaFave, Search and Seizure §11.4 (d) at 407-08 (2d Ed. 1987).

11. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE
THE INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION OF DEFENDANTS WAS AN
ILLEGAL SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTILCE I SECTION
14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment also
apply to "seizures" which fall short of arrests.
87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85,

"A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment occurs only when the officer by means of physical force or
show of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of a person."

Ld.

A seizure occurs "[wjhen a reasonable person, based on the totality of the
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation . . . but because he
believes hs is not free to leave . . . State v. Johnson. 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 34,
35 (March 21, 1989) (quoting Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87).
In J o h n s o n , the court found that the defendant was "seized" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment after her vehicle was stopped by a

-20-

police officer for a faulty break light because she was not free to leave
when the officer told her to wait while he returned to his vehicle to check
on her driver's license and to run a warrants check on the

defendant.

J o h n s o n , at 35. In J o h n s o n , as in this case, the officer reasoned that there
was a possibility the car was stolen because the driver was unable to
produce the registration certificate and there was no owner present.

Id.

Likewise, Trooper Garcia testified that Robinson and Towers were not free
to leave while he attempted to verify ownership of the vehicle.

Therefore,

their detention constituted a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.

A. The seizure of the defendants was not based on a reasonable
and articuable suspicion of criminal activity.

An investigative
enforcement
automobile's

officer

detention

or seizure is justified

only if a law

has "a reasonable and articuable suspicion that the

occupants

are

'involved

in

criminal

activity'".

State

v.

Schlosser. 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (May 17, 1989) See also. Johnson. 104
Utah Adv. Rep. at 35.

Thus, to justify the seizure of Robinson and Towers,

Trooper Garcia had to have a reasonable "articuable suspicion" that they
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had committed a crime.

In this regard "due weight must be given, not to

[t]he officers' inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch', but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience".

Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 391 U. S. 1, 27 (1968).

In J o h n s o n , the court found that the seizure of the defendant, a
passenger in the vehicle was reasonable because the initial stop of the
vehicle was legitimate, the driver of the vehicle had a suspended license
and there was no way of telling who the owner of the vehicle was and the
length of the detention was only about twenty minutes.
Adv. Rep. at 35.

Johnson, 104 Utah

In this case, the driver of the vehicle, Towers had a valid

license and Robinson told Trooper Garcia who owned the vehicle produced
telephone numbers where the owner might be reached for verfication and
stated that they had permission to be driving the van.
detention was double the length of that in J o h n s o n ,
minutes rather than twenty (20).

In addition, the
lasting fourty

(40)

Though the trooper was unable to verify

ownership of the van, there was no indication that the owner had reported
the van stolen.

In this regard, Trooper Garcia testified that sometimes its

possible that the owner could be in the trunk of the vehicle and unable to
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report the vehicle stolen, notwithstanding the fact that the van did not
have a trunk and the trooper had already observed the inside of the van
enough to determine that there was no owner inside. (R-48).

The facts that

the trooper relied upon are "just as consistent with the more likely scenario
that the driver borrowed the [van] from its rightful owner".

Johnson, 104

Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (Orme, J. dissenting).
Trooper

Garcia

testified

further

that

he detained

Robinson

and

Towers because of their "demeanor" at the beginning of the stop, (R-56),
and that from the time he asked whether he could look under the bed he
kept wondering why they wouldn't let him look.
was not for the purpose of verifying

Therefore, the detention

the ownership of the vehicle but

rather was for the purpose of looking under the bed.

This conclusion is

supported further by Trooper Garcia's testimony that he told Robinson and
Towers that they could be on their way "if they'd just let him look under
the bed.

He did not tell them he'd let them go once ownership of the van

had been verfied.
The

trial court

found

the fact

that Towers

appeared

extremely

nervous and said little and Robinson on the other hand, talked continously,
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coupled with the absence of suitable cold-weather gear and the presence of
only one fishing pole were articuable facts which gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion that defendants were involved in criminal activity.

However, the

Utah S upreme Court in State v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (May 17,
1989) rejected similar facts as a basis for articuable suspicion of criminal
activity.

Id., at 40.

In this regard, the court stated "[w]hen

confronted

with a traffic stop, it is not uncommon for drivers and passengers a like to
be nervous and excited. . . search based on such common gestures and
movements is a mere "hunch", not an articuable suspicion that satifies the
Fourth

Amendment.

Id..

The court likewise rejected "nervousness" as an

articuable fact in State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah, 1987).

In

M e n d o z a . the officer's conclusion of nervousness of the occupants of the
vehicle was based on a "white knuckled" "rigid" look and failure to make
eye contact. Id..
that

because

the

Justice Zimmerman found "ludicrous" the States' argument
defendants

"appeared"

to have

been

"unsettled"

the

officers had justification for suspecting criminal activity and characterized
the argument as "pretexual Fourth Amendment gamesmanship at its worst.
Mendoza. 748 P.2d at 187 (Zimmerman J. concurring).
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Trooper Garcia relied upon the "nervous" conduct of both defendants
as forming the basis of a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify
investigation.

further

However, the trooper did not articuate, nor did the trial

court find, how the defendants nervousness "was any different from that
observed in countless travelers."
App. 1988).

State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 944 (Utah Ct.

In this regard, the officer's mere conclusion regarding [the]

defendant's nervousness, unsupported by relevant objective facts, can have
no weight in determining if he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. IdL at 945.

B. The detention was unreasonable because it lasted longer than
necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop or to dispel the
officer's suspicion in a short period of time.

Finally, for the detention to be reasonable, it must be "temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop"
and the "investigative

methods employed

should

be the least

intrusive

means reasonable available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a
short period of time." Florida v. Rover. 460 U. S. 491, 103 s. Ct. 1319, 75 L.
Ed. 2d. 229 (1983).

The detention in this case lasted approximately forty
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minutes and thus was not temporary.

In addition, the trooper

effecuated

the purpose of the stop, writing a warning citation for a lane violation,
within the first few minutes following the stop.
to

dispel

the

their

suspicions

in

a short

Nor were the troopers able
period

of

time

but

rather

consistently tried to obtain consent to search an area of the van to which
the defendants flatly denied access over a period of fourty minutes until,
Robinson finally consented to the search.

Therefore, the dentention of the

defendants following the stop was an unreasonable seizure in violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights.

Accordingly, the evidence seized as a

result of the illegal detention should be suppressed.
III.
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE
CONSENT TO SEARCH THE BUILT-UP BED INSIDE THE VEHICLE
WAS NOT VOLUNTARY.
A. The consent is invalid because it was given pursuant to an
illegal detention.

Though Robinson eventually consented to a sniff search of the van
by a canine, the consent was obtained pursuant to an illegal detention and
is therefore invalid.

The United States Supreme Court, in Florida v. Rover,

460 U. S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 Ed. 2d 110 (1983), found that consent
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obtained as the result of an illegal detention was ineffective to justify a
subsequent

search. Id.. 103 S. Ct. at 1329.

In Rover, officers

lawfully

questioned a suspected drug courier in an airport concourse and then
asked the suspect to accompany them to a police room without returning
his drivers license or ticket which they had obtained, id., at 1322.

The

officers then asked Royer for his consent to a search of his suitcases and
Royer consented.

Though the detention was only fifteen

minutes in

duration, the Supreme Court held that Royer was, as a practical matter,
under arrest at the time he unlocked the suitcases.

Thus, the court

concluded that the consent was the fruit of an illegal arrest and was
therefore invalid and suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the
search. U. at 1329.
In this regard, the court, in Rover, concluded that the detention
which the suspect was subjected to at the time he consented to the search
was "a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on
mere suspicion of criminal activity".

Id., at 1327. Since Royer was not free

to leave, the court reasoned, "any consensual aspects of the encounter had
evaporated".

Therefore, the encounter had turned into an arrest requiring
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probable cause. Id..

The court also noted that, had Royer refused consent to

a search of his luggage, the officers would have held the luggage and
sought a search warrant to authorize the search. Id.
In this case, Robinson and Towers had been detained over twenty
minutes

and

Robinson

had repeatedly

denied

built-up compartment located within the van.

consent

to search

the

As in Royer, Robinson was

clearly under arrest at the time he finally consented to the canine search.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that neither defendant was free to
leave and by Trooper Garcia's testimony that he told Robinson and Towers
they could be on their way only if they would let the troopers look inside
the built-up compartment within the van.

In this regard, had Robinson

refused consent to the canine search, troopers testified that they would
have impounded the van and sought a search warrant to authorize the
search.

Clearly, as in Rover, "any consenual aspects of the encounter had

evaporated" at this point.

In addition, Robinson and Towers were never

advised of their right to refuse consent by either trooper which was
another factor considered determinative by the court in Royer. Id., at 1327.
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In conclusion, Robinson's eventual consent was obtained as the result
of an illegal detention and therefore is ineffective.
of the van and subsequent detention

Even if the initial stop

of the van were reasonable, the

defendants as a practical matter, were under arrest at the time consent
was given, therefore the confinement went beyond the limited restraint of
an investigative stop and, in the absence of probable cause, was illegal.
Rover at 1326.

As previously discussed, the facts relied upon by Trooper

the defendants and are certainly not sufficient to constitute probable cause
for arrest as required by R o v e r .

Consequently, Robinson's consent was

"tainted by the illegality requiring reversal" in the absence of probable
cause. IcL

Therefore, the consent obtained pursuant to the illegal detention

is ineffective to justify the search nor sufficiently voluntary to purge the
taint of the primary illegality.

Accordingly, the evidence seized as a result

of the search based on the involuntary consent should be suppressed.
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IX,
I.

ARGUMENT

THE ILLEGAL DRUG TAX LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT
IT VIOLATES THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE.
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power

"to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states . •..n

U.S.C.A., Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

The Consti-

tution has long been interpreted to give Congress the exclusive
power to regulate interstate commerce and the sole power to act
in the area of taxation on interstate commerce.
States Portland
(1959).

Northwestern

Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458

Congress1 power under the Constitution applies to all

commerce including trade in marijuana.

The federal government

has passed numerous laws regulating trade in marijuana and other
controlled substances.

See 21 U.S.C., Chapter 13, Drug Abuse

Prevention and Control.

The authority of Congress to pass such

acts is based totally on Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution.

United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d

1972).

The Lopez Court found that:

949, 950

(5th Cir.

As the basis for the exercise of its power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate certain activities
in controlled substances, Congress made certain
findings and declarations which are set forth in
§ 101 of Title II of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801.
Principal among these were the findings that intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled
substances, such as manufacture, local distribution and possession, had a substantial and direct
effect on interstate commerce; that such intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances; that it was impossible to distinguish
between substances manufactured and distributed
intrastate from those manufactured and distributed
interstate and, therefore, it was not feasible to
distinguish between -such substances in terms of
controls; and that control of the intrastate incidents traffic in controlled substances was essential to the control of interstate incidents of
that traffic.
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Certainly those doing business in a state are liable for
taxes on the business.

Complete Auto Transit/ Inc. v. Brady,

430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).

However, it is unconstitutional to

place a tax on interstate commerce.

Northwestern States Port-

land Cement Co., at 458; Hodgesin v. Ryatt Realty and Investment
Co., Inc., 353 F.Supp. 1363, 1374 (N.D.NC 1973).
The Supreme Court has determined that a tax on interstate
commerce is only constitutional if it meets four criterion:
1.

It must be applied to an activity with a substantial

nexus to the taxing state;
2.

It must be fairly apportioned;

3.

It must not discriminate against interstate commerce;

4.

It must be fairly related to the services provided by

and

the state.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., at 1079.
None

of

these

criterion

apply

to

the current case.

First, the nexus to the State of Utah is slim.

Kim Robinson and

Francis Towers were merely driving through the State of Utah.
They were not doing any business in the state.

In Complete Auto

Transit, Inc., the plaintiffs delivered automobiles from a train
depot in Mississippi to retailers in the state. j[d. at 276. In
another case, the Supreme Court found a sufficient nexus between
the state of Montana and coal miners to levy a severance tax
even though most of the coal was destined for interstate commerce.

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-

618

(1981).

The Supreme Court quoted favorably the Montana

Supreme Court, as stating, "there can be no argument here that a
substantial, in fact the only, nexus of the severance of coal is
established in Montana."

]j3. at 617.

Transit, Inc. and Commonwealth
Francis Towers were merely

Unlike in Complete Auto

Edison Co., Kim Robinson and

transporting

a substance through

Utah, they did not transact any business in the state or have
ongoing

relationships

in the state.

The Supreme Court has

stated:

"In keeping therewith, a State cannot impose taxes upon

persons passing through the state, or coming into it merely for
a temporary purpose such as itinerant drummers."
States Portland Cement Co. , at 458.

Northwest

Therefore, since Robinson

and Towers were merely driving through Utah, a sufficient nexus
does not exist between their activity and the State of Utah to
allow the state to tax their alleged activities.
The second factor listed in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.,
is that the tax must be fairly apportioned.
aforementioned

requirement

is

to

insure

jurisdictions do not tax the same activity.

The purpose of the
that

two

different

Japan Lines Ltd. v.

County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 447 (1979) (a state may
only tax those activities that occur within its boundaries.

See

Dept. of Revenue for the State of Washington v. Assoc, of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 746-747 (1978).

And

while a railroad that is in the business of transportation may
be taxed for its activity in transporting merchandise through a
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state, an individual may not be so taxed where the merchandise
neither originates in the state or is destined for the state.
The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. v. Rose, 651 F.Supp. 1483,
1480 (S.D.WV 1985) .
The problem with the Utah statute is that it does not
allow for apportionment.

If the substance allegedly transported

by Robinson and Towers went through ten states without apportionment, each state could fully tax the merchandise.
Historically,
states
have
developed
various
methods ... to comply with the constitutional mandate. The use of apportionment formulas has been
favored because, in theory, they prevent interstate commerce from being cumulatively burdened by
repeated taxation of the same incident. Additionally, when taxes are directly related to sufficient local activities of a multistate business,
they are by that very fact uniquely defined and
thus not capable of multiple application ....
Accordingly, when the privilege taxed is exercised
before interstate commerce begins or the tax is
imposed upon a sufficiently local incident such as
"storage," it has been sustained but when the
exaction has been found to be on goods actually
"moving in interstate commerce" or consumed therein, the law has succumbed under commerce clause
attack.
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Municipality of San
Juan, 505 F.Supp. 533, 550-551 (D.PR 1980) (citations omitted).
Assuming that the marijuana in the vehicle passed through
ten states including Utah, and each state taxed it, without
apportionment, the tax would be very high ($35.00 per gram), and
it would

unfairly

discriminate

against

interstate commerce.

Marijuana grown and distributed in a state could be sold for
$31.50
states.

less per

gram

than

that which

traveled

through ten

The mere fact that the alleged marijuana may not have
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been taxed in another jurisdiction is unimportant.

Without a

proper apportionment system, a tax unconstitutionally violated
the interstate commerce clause and cannot be collected.

j[d. at

554.
The third factor, discrimination, is closely related to
the apportionment factor.
apply

equally

to

While the tax appears on its face to

marijuana

produced

in

Utah

and

marijuana

brought into the state, we must look at the effect of the legislation,

^d. at 549.

By failing to apportion the tax and by

allowing other jurisdictions to fully tax the substance, the law
provides for an unfair advantage for marijuana grown in Utah and
such is discriminatory.
The final factor listed in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. is
that the tax must be fairly related to the services provided by
the state.

As the Supreme Court has stated, "when the measure

of a tax bears no relationship to the taxpayers presence for
activities in a state, a Court may properly conclude under the
fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, that the State
is imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce."
wealth Edison, at 629.

Common-

The statute in question provides no

nexus between services provided by the state and the amount of
the tax.

The tax does not vary whether the marijuana is in the

state for five minutes or five years.

Merely driving through a

state is an insufficient nexus to prove presence in a state for
the interstate commerce clause.
1480;

Northwestern

States

Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, at

Portland

Cement

Company,

at 458.

Presence requires more than the mere "moving in interstate commerce. n

Sea-Land Services, Inc., at 551.

very heart of the commerce clause.

For this hits at the

It sets up insurmountable

boundaries to the interstate transportation of goods by requiring individuals to stop at the state boundary and pay a tax for
the right to cross the state line.

It is this very right that

has allowed for the magnificent growth of the American economy
in contrast to that of other parts of the world.
imitate

the tremendous

growth

in the American

In order to
economy, the

European Common Market has adopted as a major goal the abolishing of all trade barriers between the European nations by 1992.
Thus, since the state of Utah did not provide those services to
Robinson and Tower normally provided to citizens of the state
other than to allow them to travel across the state, the tax is
unconstitutional under the fourth and final prong of Complete
Auto Transit.
II.

THE ILLEGAL DRUG TAX IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT
IT VIOLATES THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S FREEDOM FROM
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

states that:

"No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself."

The Fifth Amendment

provides the right not to provide information as long as that
information may be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
Garnev v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1974).

The rights

provided by the amendment arise whenever the government seeks
information that will subject the individual to criminal liability.

Id.

at 655. The federal government and most state govern-

ments outlaw the possession

of marijuana.

In Marchetti v.

United States, the Supreme Court found a federal occupational
tax on wagering to unconstitutionally require an individual to
incriminate himself.

390 U.S. 39, 42 (1968).

Under the federal statute in Marchetti, an individual was
required to register with the Internal Revenue Service buy wagering stamps, and post the stamps in a conspicuous place.
42-43.

j[d. at

The Court found the statute created a "real and appreci-

able ... hazard of incrimination."

Ld. at 48.

The Supreme

Court found that the "petitioner was confronted by a comprehensive system of federal and state prohibitions against wagering
activities, he was required
might

reasonably

suppose

to provide information which he

would

be

available

to prosecuting

authorities, and which would surely prove a significant 'link in
a chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt.'"

Id.

(citations omitted).
While the Illegal Drug Tax Statute does not require registration, the mere purchase of the stamps is an admission of
illegal activity under Section 59-19-107(2), Utah Code Annotated
1953.

The law does not apply to persons lawfully in possession

of marijuana.

Thus, unlike the statute in Marchetti, the mere

purchase of the stamps is an admission of criminal behavior.

In

Marchetti, the Court found that wagering was an area permeated
with criminal statutes and those engaging

in wagering are a

group "inherently suspect of criminal activities."
(citations omitted).

JEci. at 47

In our case those subject to the statute

are not only suspect of criminal activities but by law are
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guilty of criminal activity.

Therefore, the mere act of pur-

chasing the stamps is an admission of criminal behavior and
being

compelled

to purchase

such stamps violated

the Fifth

Amendment.
Not only the compelled purchase of the stamps violates
the Constitution but Section 59-19-104(1), Utah Code Annotated
1953, also violates the Fifth Amendment in its requirement that
said stamps be displayed.

Knowledge of the substance is an

element of the offense.
Therefore, the posting of the stamps on the contraband is
an admission that the defendant had knowledge of the illegal
nature of the substance.

As a result, the act of posting the

stamp is a "link in a chain of evidence tending to establish his
guilt."

Id. at 48 (citation omitted).

Nowhere in the act does

it say that evidence that an individual posted the stamps on the
contraband is inadmissible at trial to show knowledge of the
illegal nature of the substance.
III.

THE UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG TAX ACT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
AND THEREFORE THE CONVICTION IS INVALID.
Section 59-19-104, Utah Code Annotated 1953, forbids a

marijuana dealer from possessing marijuana unless the illegal
drug tax is paid upon the marijuana.
Code Annotated, states:

Section 59-19-105(3), Utah

"Payments required by this chapter

shall be made to the commission on forms provided by the commission.

Dealers are not required to give their name, address,

social security number, or other identifying information on this
form.

The commission shall collect all taxes imposed under this

chapter."

Therefore, the only way the State of Utah can deter-

mine whether or not Kim Robinson and Francis Towers violated the
law is whether or not they have properly exhibited the required
stamps.

And in fact Section 59-19-104(1), Utah Code Annotated

1953, states:

"The commission shall adopt a uniform system of

providing, affixing

and displaying

official

stamps, official

labels, or other official indicia for marijuana and controlled
substances on which a tax is imposed.i'
The commission has failed to adopt any regulations under
Section 59-19-104(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953.

As a result,

Kim Robinson and Francis Towers had no directions on where to
place said stamps.

Furthermore, the arresting officer could not

know where to look for the stamps.

Therefore, the law, lacking

the required regulations, failed to provide sufficient guidance
to Kim Robinson and Francis Towers on how to comply with the law
and it failed to provide the arresting officers with a method of
determining whether Kim Robinson and Francis Towers were in violation of the law.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits vague laws.

Village of

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497
(1982) .
Vague laws offend several important values.
First, because we assume that man is free to steer
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory

1/ Please see Attachment A, ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX A C T , UTAH
CODE ANN. §58-19-101-107 (1988).

enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them, A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
applications.
The Supreme Court has declared that, lfas generally stated
the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."

Kolender v. Lawson, 466 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).

The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violated the first essential of due
process of law." The requirement that government
articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of
clarity ensures that state power will be exercised
only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social values,
reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination
in the administration of the laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirement of law, and permits meaningful judicial review.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
629 (1984) (citations omitted).
A law such as the Utah illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, unaccompanied by the required regulations "confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge a person with a
violation

of

the

[statute]

is unconstitutional

because

the

opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a
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virtually open-ended interpretation is self evident."

Board of

Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc.,

U.S.

, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 2573 (1987).

Without

the legally required regulations, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to provide citizens with the knowledge necessary to allow them to comply with the law in that a
dealer does not know where to place the stamp in order to follow
the law.

Also, without the regulations state agents cannot tell

whether or not an individual is complying with the law since
they do not know where to look for the properly posted stamps.
As a result the opportunity for abuse and illegal arrests is
flagrant in that the authorities cannot determine what behaviors
violate the law since they cannot determine whether an individual has obtained the stamps and whether the stamps are properly
posted.
Certainly in interpreting the validity of a statute in
light of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a Court may consider
other judicial or enforcement agency regulations.
355.

Kolender, at

But in this case the State Tax Commission has failed to

fulfill its mandated task of developing such regulations.
result the statute without

the required

found to be constitutionally invalid.

-49-

As a

regulations must be

X. CONCLUSION

Based

on

the authorities

presented,

defendants,

Robinson

and

Towers seek reversal of their convictions on Count I because it was based
on illegally seized evidence and reversal of their convictions and an
acquittal on Count II because the conviction was based on a statute which
is unconstitutional.
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II.I.KGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT

59-19-103

CHAPTER 19
ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT
ecLion
9-19-101
•9-19-102
.9-19-103
•9-19-104
>9-19-105

Section
Short title
Definitions
Tax imposed on marihuana and
controlled substances
Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be
provided and sold by the commission
Stamps to be affixed to marihuana and controlled substance

59-19 106
59-19-107

Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1988 ch 11,
^ 1 to 14, also enacted a new * r)9 19 101 et
M.«q Because of the enactment of ^ 59-19-101

59-19-101.

— Anonymity provided when
purchasing stamps
Civil penalty — Criminal penaltv
— Statute of limitations — Burden of proof
Commission to administer tax —
No criminal immunity for
dealers

et seq by Laws 1988 ch 246, H 1 to 7, the
provisions enacted by Laws 1988, ch 11, were
renumbered as ^ 59 20-101 et seq

Short title.

This chapter is known as the "Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act."
History: C. 1953, 59-19-101, enacted by L.
1988, c h . 246, $ 1.

59-19-102.

Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988

Definitions.

As used in this chapter
(1) "Controlled substance" means any drug or substance, whether real
or counterfeit, as defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold m violation of Utah laws. It
does not include marihuana
(2) "Dealer" means a person who, in violation of Utah law, manufactures, produces, ships, transports, or imports into Utah or in any manner
acquires or possesses more than 42V-2 grams of m a r i h u a n a , or seven or
more grams of any controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units of
any controlled substance which is not sold by weight
(3) "Marihuana" means any marihuana, whether real or counterfeit, as
defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws.
History: C. 1953, 59-19-102, enacted by L.
1988. ch. 246, * 2.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 246, * 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988

59-19-103. Tax imposed on m a r i h u a n a and controlled substances.
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled substances as defined
under this chapter at the following rates*
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a gram, $3 50;
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(b) on each gram of controlled substance, or each portion of a gram,
$200, and
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance t h a t is not sold by
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax under this chapter, a q u a n t i t y of
narihuana or other controlled substance is measured by the weight of the
ubstance, whether pure or impure or dilute, or by dosage units when the
ubstance is not sold by weight, in the d e a l e r s possession A q u a n t i t y of a
ontrolled substance is dilute if it consists of a detectable quantity of pure
ontrolled substance and any excipients or fillers
History: C. 1953, 59-19-103, enacted by L.
988, c h . 246, $ 3.

Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988

S9-19-104. Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be provided a n d
sold by the commission.
(1) The commission shall adopt a uniform system of providing, affixing, and
'isplaying official stamps, official labels, or other official indicia for marim a n a and controlled substances on which a tax is imposed
(2) A dealer may not possess any m a r i h u a n a or controlled substance upon
v^hich a tax is imposed by this chapter, unless the tax has been paid on the
n a r i h u a n a or other controlled substance as evidenced by a stamp or other
fflcial indicia
(3) Official stamps, labels, or other indicia to be affixed to all m a r i h u a n a or
ontrolled substances shall be purchased from the commission The purchaser
hall pay 100% of face value for each stamp, label, or other indicia at the time
f the purchase
History. C. 1953, 59-19-10-1, enacted by L.
988, ch 246, § 4

•9-19-105-

Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246 ^ 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988

Stamps to be affixed to m a r i h u a n a a n d controlled substance — Anonymity provided w h e n
p u r c h a s i n g stamps.

(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires, transports, or imports into this state
l a n h u a n a or controlled substances, he shall permanently affix the official
idicia on the marihuana or controlled substances evidencing the p a y m e n t of
le tax required under this chapter No stamp or other official indicia may be
sed more than once
(2) Taxes imposed upon marihuana or controlled substances by this chapter
re due and payable immediately upon acquisition or possession in this state
y a dealer
(3) Payments required by this chapter shall be made to the commission on
•rms provided by the commission Dealers are not required to give their
ame, address, Social Security number, or other identifying information on
ie form. The commission shall collect all taxes imposed under this chapter
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ENTERPRISE ZONE ACT
History: C 1953, 59-19-105, enacted by L
SS9 ch. 246, § 5

9-19-106.

59-19-107

Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246, <> 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988

Civil penalty — Criminal p e n a l t y — Statute of
limitations — B u r d e n of proof.

(1) Any dealer violating this chapter is subject to a penalty of 100% of the
ix in addition to the tax imposed by Section 59-19-103 The penalty shall be
>llected as part of the tax
(2) In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possesslg m a r i h u a n a or controlled substances without affixing the appropriate
tamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a felony of the third degree and is
ubject to a fine of not more than $10,000, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of the criminal laws of this state,
n information, indictment, or complaint may be filed upon any criminal
ffense under this chapter within six years after the commission of this ofense
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by the commission are presumed to be
ahd and correct The burden is on the taxpayer to show their incorrectness or
nvahdity.
History: C. 1953, 59-19-106, enacted by L
1988, ch. 246, § 6.

Effective Dates — Laws 1988 ch 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988

59-19-107. Commission to administer tax — No criminal
immunity for dealers.
(1) The commission shall administer this chapter and may adopt rules necessary to enforce this chapter
(2) Nothing in this chapter requires persons lawfully in possession of marihuana or a controlled substance to pay the tax required under this chapter
(3) Nothing in this chapter provides immunity of any kind for a dealer from
criminal prosecution under Utah law
History: C. 1953, 59-19-107, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, § 7.

Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246, <> 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988

CHAPTER 20
ENTERPRISE ZONE ACT
Section
59-20-101
59-20-102
59-20-103
59-20-104
59-20-105
59-20 106

Short title
Definitions
Powers of the Department of
Community and Economic De
velopment
Criteria for designation of enter
prise zones — Application
Qualifying local contributions —
Employee categories
Eligibility review

Section
59-20-107
59-20-108
59-20-109
59-20-110
59-20-111
59-20-112
59-20 113
59-20-114
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Quarterly consideration
Duration of designation
Contingent designations
Revocation of designations
Disqualifying transfers
Businesses qualifying for tax incentives
State tax credits
Annual report

